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Abstract
Plea bargaining, one of the top-level system design 
priorities in China’s judicial reform, was officially 
written into the 2018 amended Criminal Procedure Law 
of the People’s Republic of China. A comprehensive 
legal system of substantive and procedural regulations 
combined, plea bargaining has undoubtedly set off a craze 
for the theoretical study of criminal procedure and made 
invaluable assets in it. In plea bargaining, however, how 
prosecuting authorities exercise the power of supervision 
is rarely learned. Given that, this paper will explore how 
prosecuting authorities deal with cases where the accused 
appeal for a lenient sentence after agreed plea bargains 
and how they exercise the power of supervision to avoid 
the dilemma of “prosecutorial counter-appeals in response 
to appeals” and get rid of misunderstandings of trial 
supervision. 
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1. PRACTICES OF PROSECUTORIAL 
COUNTER-APPEALS IN PLEA BARGAINING 
In September, 2016, the Standing Committee of China’s 
National People’s Congress decided that 18 cities across 
the country will pilot plea bargaining in criminal cases in 
a two-year period. It turns out that the appeal rate of plea 
bargaining has since stayed at a low level compared to 
other cases. Statistics from the interim report of the pilot 
program by the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate reveal that of all cases involving 
plea bargaining, appeals by plaintiffs in an incidental civil 
action takes up less than 0.1% of the total, defendants’ 
appeals as low as 3.6% and prosecutorial counter-appeals 
an astonishing 0.04%.1 What is unexpected by the pros-
ecuting authorities is that some of the defendants have 
appealed against the sentence in the verdict after plead-
ing guilty with a sentence bargain since 2018 when plea 
bargaining was initially put into effect. This practice is 
further followed by more defendants in the Lucifer Ef-
fect, which in a way disrupts the authority of plea bargain 
agreements and offsets the procedural convenience and 
efficiency brought by the scheme. This kind of dilemma 
was tackled office by office as it took a piddling propor-
tion and the problem failed to reach the decision-making 
panel at the initial phase of the implementation. But pros-
ecutors should not be steered away, as Prosecutor Zhang 
Jun puts it, from diving deep into every individual case 
with the professional sensitivity and responsibility that 
prosecutorial experts sport (Zhang, 2019, pp.5-11). There-
fore, prosecutors handling such cases should be wary of 
irregular practices like prosecutorial counter-appealing 
immediately following defendants’ appeals and work to 
prevent potential expansions. 
1  See “Interim Report on the Pilot Program of Plea Bargaining in 
Criminal Cases in Selected Regions” delivered by the President of 
the Supreme People’s Court Zhou Qiang to the Supreme People’s 
Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate at the 31st Session of 
the Standing Committee of the 12th the National People’s Congress 
(NPC)on December 23, 2017. 
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1.1 Causes of Prosecutorial Counter-Appeals in Plea 
Bargaining
A. The prosecuting authorities file counter-appeals in 
response to the defendants’ appeals. It has proved that 
prosecuting authorities may file counter-appeals to 
the defendants’ appeals against the sentencing in plea 
bargaining. 
a. Appeal for Potential Sentence Serving in Detention 
Centers. 
This kind of behavior is called technical appeals, where 
the defendant, without any substantial objection to the 
sentence determined by the people’s court of first instance, 
takes advantage of the time span of the second instance 
and the principle of no heavier sentencing for appeal and 
appeals against the sentencing to delay the litigation time 
span and the term of custody before finally spared from 
prison labor when the term of imprisonment, with the 
term of detention deducted, meet the conditions of serving 
sentences in detention centers (Dong, 2019, pp.117-124). 
In reality, there are cases where the defendant appeals 
in the name of a lesser sentence for potential serving in 
detention centers. Under such circumstances, prosecuting 
authorities tend to conditionally opt for a counter-appeal 
for the absence of universal standards in order to observe 
the authority of the legal system of the plea bargaining by 
exemplifying litigation trust and, on the other, suppress 
similar practices for efficient and economical litigation 
and further the grouping of complicated and common cas-
es of plea bargaining. 
b. Appeal For a Sentence Discount. 
For cases where the accused file an appeal for a 
deducted sentence following the sentence by the people’s 
court of first instance, such practices can be deemed as 
subversion to the fundamental of plea bargaining, betrayal 
of agreement with prosecuting authorities and disruption 
to the basis of legal theory. To ensure plea bargaining 
is consistently put in force, prosecuting authorities are 
inclined to file a counter-appeal in court, requesting a 
heavier sentence as the punishment for their breach of 
trust, which is expected to serve as a warning. 
B. Sentencing recommendations are denied by 
courts. In practice, with plea bargaining agreement 
settled between both parties, sentence recommended 
by prosecuting authorities will have to go through the 
procedural examination by courts before being approved 
and adopted. Nevertheless, a small number of cases 
have seen the courts’ refusal to adopt the sentences 
recommended by public prosecuting authorities in 
consideration of its own discretionary power (Li, 2020) 
or sentence recommendation deemed as infringement of 
the individualization of sentencing. In this case, it is the 
courts’ false sentencing that the prosecuting authorities 
counter-appeal for. What this kind of prosecutorial 
counter-appeals reveals is a wrestling contest between 
jurisdiction and public prosecution that vie to domineer 
in the sentencing of cases involving plea bargaining. 
Therefore, this category of cases in plea bargaining will 
not be given further explanation in the rest of the paper. 
1.2 Practice of Unreasonable Legal Supervision
Firstly, according to Article 228 of Criminal Procedure 
Law of the People’s Republic of China, a defendant who 
pleads guilty and agree with the sentence recommendation 
with a recognizance signed in the prosecution phase 
based on his or her will find his or her appeal ruled 
as an objection to sentence even on the ground of 
disproportionality between guilt and sentencing. The 
ruling suggests that the previous sentencing by the 
people’s court of first instance, which is based on the 
facts of a crime, is reasonable. Prosecutorial counter-
appeals on the ground that “a defendant who refuses to 
agree with the previously settled sentence shall be given 
severer penalty”, which is theoretically in line with the 
principle of “denying of the previously settled sentencing 
guarantees no sentence discounts”, are not solidly 
grounded because of the absence of errors committed by 
judges or mistakes caused indirectly by the defendant’s 
exercise of the right of appeal. 
Secondly, in legal practice, prosecuting authorities 
tend to avoid counter-appeals in criminal cases where 
plea bargaining is not applicable accompanied by a 
withdrawal of confession by the defendant after the 
sentencing in the first instance. Despite the fact that the 
defendant’s confession is not ascertained in the second 
instance, his or her appeal can only be dismissed. In 
common criminal offences where plea bargaining is 
not applicable, especially those should have adopted 
the scheme of plea bargaining for the defendant’s plea 
of guilt, prosecuting authorities would not even, in 
the second instance, request the deprival of sentence 
discounts enjoyed by the defendant in the first instance 
due to his or her appeal when the criminal investigators 
are working with a heavy workload or the term of 
sentence does not meet the minimal requirement of plea 
bargaining. By this measure, how can a counter-appeal 
be filed against the defendant for the mere reason that a 
recognizance has been signed? 
In my opinion, in the event of improper use of 
prosecutorial counter-appeals under the current legal 
framework, the practice of this counter-appealing power 
should temporarily be steered to comply with the principle 
of parsimony to avoid the realization of substantive 
justice at the expense of procedural justice. Otherwise, 
the credibility of legal supervision will, to some extent, 
be disrupted by the consistent practice of prosecutorial 
counter-appeal ing wi th  consequent ia l  impeded 
implementation of plea bargaining. 
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2. REFLECTION ON THE LEGITIMACY OF 
PROSECUTORIAL COUNTER-APPEALS
From the perspective of prosecuting authorities, a set 
of performance evaluation standards involving case 
assessment, represented by the “ratio of case to action”2, 
has been universally adopted by prosecuting authorities 
throughout the country. With such a strict evaluation 
system, some public prosecutors still risk filing counter-
appeals against defendants. Following are some of the 
supporting viewpoints of prosecutorial counter-appeals 
and their interpretation. 
2.1 Supporting Arguments
A. Proponents reckons that an appeal represents a denial 
of the ascertained facts, charges or the sentencing in 
the first instance and in substance, a subversion of the 
fact of the defendant’s plea of guilt and acceptance of 
sentence in the verdict. As they argue, this is one of the 
situations where “there is new-found evidence to prove 
that the verdict or the facts ascertained in the verdict are 
indeed wrong” stipulated in the Opinions of the Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate on Strengthening and Improving 
the Exercise of Prosecutorial Counter-appeal in Criminal 
Cases. In this case, prosecuting authorities should file a 
counter-appeal according to Article 217 in the Criminal 
Procedure Law. 
But the question is whether this kind of denial belongs 
to the situations where “there is new-found evidence 
to prove that the verdict or the facts ascertained in the 
verdict are indeed wrong”. As far as I am concerned, the 
answer is a no. First of all, the facts of the case should not 
be interpreted extensively to the detriment of the accused. 
This means facts should be confined to those occurring 
prior to trial regardless of whether they are discovered 
at the time of trial rather than those occurring after trial. 
What the procedures for prosecutorial counter-appeal and 
trial supervision target are those have occurred already 
yet escaped discovery. Otherwise, judicial decisions will 
never be settled if facts occurring subsequent to trial 
are included. Secondly, a strict set of criteria should be 
established for the identification of errors. In court, a 
judicial decision is made based on the facts and evidence 
at the time of trial. According to the principle that an 
ex post action shall not retroactively change the legal 
2  “Case” refers to the total number of cases of arrest under 
review accepted and cases of prosecution under review with those 
involving mandatory measures of arrest excluded, while “action” 
refers to services prosecuting authorities conduct for a case, 
including reconsideration for non-arrest decision, review for non-
arrest decision, appeal for (non) arrest, investigative detention 
time extension, supplementary investigation, reconsideration for 
non-prosecution decision, review for non-prosecution decision, 
suggested adjourning trial, criminal appeal, prosecutorial counter-
appeal, counter-appeal in trial supervision procedure, retrial, appeal 
against non-prosecution decision and criminal appeal against trial, 
etc.
consequences of actions that were committed, the previous 
verdict should not be deemed as wrong. Last but not least, 
public authorities have been following the administrative 
principle that everything which is not allowed is 
forbidden. With the absence of established guidelines for 
prosecutorial counter-appealing, prosecuting authorities 
that file counter-appeals at the risk of breach of law will 
inevitably give an image of answering injustice with 
injustice when seen from the perspective of prosecutors 
who tend to appeal for breach of agreement. In addition, 
some of the accused who are wily enough to take full 
advantage of the loopholes in the existing procedure of 
legal documents delivery would file an appeal on the last 
day of the statutory period for appealing. At this point, 
any desire to file an application for counter-appeal will 
be dampened by the extremely limited time span, let 
alone reexamining the files and composing a document of 
counter-appeal suggestions. 
B. Some also believe that it is an imperative for 
prosecuting authorities to deter with counter-appeals the 
defendants’ attempted evasion from legal sanctions by 
means of plea bargaining in order to maintain consistent 
implementation of legal systems and how solemn a plea of 
guilty and acceptance of punishment should be. The fact 
is that the principle of no heavier sentencing for appeal 
leaves room for the accused to deny a confessed crime at 
precious little expense and even to earn a further lenient 
sentence from the court. In practice, some courts and 
judges support prosecuting authorities in lodging protests 
against such appeals for a decreased appeal rate and 
increased efficiency of trial resources. Furthermore, either 
a counter-appeal or a modification of the original sentence 
in such cases will not impose an impact on how courts 
and judges will be evaluated in terms of their performance 
(Bao & Chen, 2019, pp. 57-60).
I would express reservations about the potential 
impacts on the implementation of the scheme as 
expressed in this viewpoint. The right of prosecutorial 
counter-appeals, one of the essential, rigid ways for 
prosecuting authorities to conduct supervision, must be 
strictly restricted and prudently exercised, or its abuse or 
generalization will inflict damage to its legitimacy and 
authority as well as the legal and social effects brought 
when it is properly exercised. Firstly, cases concerning 
pleaded guilt and punishment are normally simple ones, 
which will not necessarily bring excessive workload to 
judicial authorities even when there are appeals filed, 
while cases involving prosecutorial counter-appeals 
require a procedure of higher standards, which will 
complicate simple issues by greatly adding to judicial 
expenses and burdening the parties. Secondly, excessive 
prosecutorial counter-appeals will disrupt judicial 
credibility. On one hand, a certain level of tensions has 
been seen between practicing the right of prosecutorial 
counter-appeals and upholding the authority of judicial 
decisions. Because of it, most countries have established 
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draconian restrictions on the right of prosecutorial 
counter-appeals, so normally only trials that apparently 
violate the due process will be responded with a 
prosecutorial counter-appeal. On the other, prosecutorial 
counter-appeals will be exposed to a lot of uncertainty 
if their filing depends solely on the defendants’ appeals. 
For instance, once a defendant withdraws the appeal, 
the seriousness of prosecutorial counter-appeal will 
suffer. Thirdly, attempts to strive for substantive justice 
through prosecutorial counter-appeals in such cases may 
backfire. In modern criminal lawsuit philosophy, the 
idea of “safeguard human rights” overweighs the one 
of “crack down on criminal crimes”. The commanding 
exercise of state power for justice in individual cases can 
undisputedly deter some speculators from ill intentions, 
but it will also bring much burden to the defendants who 
consequently dare not exercise the right of appeal granted 
by law to protect his or her own rights and interests, thus 
damaging the judicial justice. In one of Nietzsche’s works, 
a classic quote reads, whoever fights monsters should see 
to it that in the process he does not become a monster; and 
if you gaze long enough into an abyss, the abyss will gaze 
back to you.3 Therefore, prosecutors should be vigilant for 
the situations where they are subject to arbitrary exercise 
of power and overstep the limits of due procedures in 
order to achieve substantive justice.
C. Some supporters believe that prosecuting authorities 
should answer defendants’ appealing with counter-
appealing as both parties are equal in front of law. As the 
verdict comes from the negotiation between both parties, 
a recognizance will take effect as thre way an agreement 
works, which requires both parties to follow as obliged. As 
they argue, since the accused can tear apart the previously 
signed agreement by means of appealing, prosecuting 
authorities can take a same approach in response.
From the perspectives of attribute, theoretical 
foundation and function, prosecutorial counter-appeals, 
one of the ways trials are supervised, is firstly a significant 
power that prosecuting authorities exercise to urge judicial 
authorities to correct their mistakes. Furthermore, the 
principle of checks and balances and legal supervision 
underpinning prosecutorial counter-appeals are both 
aimed at the division and orderly exercise of state powers 
to further check powers and protect legitimate rights. 
Therefore, it defies the theoretical foundation when 
prosecutorial counter-appeals are filed based on the equal 
status of both parties. Also, what prosecutorial counter-
appeals in criminal cases serve have evolved from a 
singularity of litigation supervision to a multifunctional 
combination of litigation supervision, substantive justice, 
human rights protection and procedural remedy, but 
litigation supervision remains the primary function. 
Lastly, prosecutorial counter-appeals target trials by courts 
3  See the website https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/18463-
whoever-fights-monsters-should-see-to-it-that-in-the. 
to restrict the way judicial power is exercised. Logically, it 
is trying to realize judicial justice by correcting erroneous 
trials, while responding to a defendant’s denial of his 
or her previous confessed guilts and accepted sentence 
terms with a prosecutorial counter-appeal is essentially 
a practice of suspicious judicial hegemony in the name 
of trial supervision, rather than an effort to go against 
the erroneous trials by courts as it seems to be. In this 
case, what supervision and checks of power truly serve 
is neglected and the definitions of how prosecutorial 
counter-appealing is positioned, what it serves and what it 
pursues are all undoubtably defied. 
2.2 Causes of Prosecutorial Counter-Appeals in 
Response to Defendants’ Appeals
2.2.1 Demanding Targets in Plea Bargaining
At the initial stage, the number of the cases involving 
prosecutorial counter-appeals remained at a low level in 
pilot areas for two reasons. The first one is, with relevant 
regulations still improving, prosecuting authorities 
have trodden cautiously when it came to whether to 
file a prosecutorial counter-appeal. A counter-appeal 
independent from thorough considerations will bring a 
blurring picture of how the system of plea bargaining 
works in pilot areas. This requires prosecuting authorities 
to react discreetly as they play an important role in the 
pilot program to ensure the consistent implementation 
of the system. Then, in place of the pressure-free 
performance evaluation scheme, a target that seven out of 
every 10 criminal cases are applied with plea bargaining 
was raised by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, China’s 
highest prosecuting authority, at the Conference on 
Criminal Prosecution in August, 2019 after the amended 
Criminal Procedure Law officially was put in force (Chen, 
2020). The target is entailed to reach 80% in two years. 
That explains why prosecuting authorities of varied levels 
answered defendants’ appeals with counter-appeals at 
the initial stage of the implementation of plea bargaining 
trying to exemplify litigation trust.4
2.2.2 Incomprehensive Interpretations of Plea 
Bargaining by Some Prosecuting Authorities
At the core of China’s system of plea bargaining is 
leniency in substantive due process and efficiency 
in procedural due process on the premise of the 
voluntary confession of defendants. In the journey to 
the perfection of plea bargaining in criminal litigation, 
litigation efficiency should be maximized on the basis of 
fundamental justice to achieve the dual goals of criminal 
punishment and human rights protection in an elevated 
level. Currently, prosecuting authorities are stepping up 
efforts in determinate sentencing, but the fact is with 
4  See the article titled “A Counter-appeal by the Tianhe Prosecuting 
authority in Response to the Defendant’s Appeal after Pleading 
Guilty Was Accepted” on Wechat official account Tianhe Prosecution 
published on 4 April, 2019. 
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indeterminate sentencing still pervasive in legal practice, 
determinate sentencing would be a transient advance if it 
is implemented without similar cases offering insights and 
the support of a penal of professional investigators. 
2.2.3 Absence of Supporting Laws
With the absence of regulations in terms of whether 
the accused are granted the right to appeal for a lenient 
sentence term after the verdict in the first instance in 
current laws, prosecuting authorities are trapped in a 
conundrum where prosecutorial counter-appealing is 
hard to decide on. As Montesquieu put it, every man 
invested with power is apt to abuse it, and to carry his 
authority as far as it will go. Whether the practice of 
filing a prosecutorial counter-appeal in the name of legal 
supervision should be deemed as abuse of power depends 
on if it is exercised by the principle of rule of law. 
Under the current circumstance, prosecuting authorities 
are apparently given vaster discretion than reasonable 
levels in the decision of a counter-appeal. In fact, public 
prosecutors are inclined to place a counter-appeal as their 
first choice. 
2.2.4 Insufficient Negotiation of Sentence Terms and 
Inadequate Protection for the Free Will Of Defendants
According to Article 173 of the Criminal Procedure 
Law of the People’s Republic of China, sentencing 
recommendation should come from the negotiation of 
both parties based on the defendants’ voluntary plea of 
guilt. It is a shame that despite the insights into litigation 
efficiency China has gained in terms of its establishment 
and application of the system of plea bargaining from the 
common law, regulations of the rights of the accused need 
further improvement. A particular example is that with 
“trade” replaced by “negotiation” between both parties, the 
rights of prosecution still outweigh those of the accused 
in China’s plea bargaining. In this case, negotiations with 
the aid of defense lawyers or duty lawyers remain hard to 
identify. As it is put in the pilot program report, a certain 
number of pilot areas saw criminal suspects be told by 
prosecuting authorities to either agree with the sentencing 
recommendation or witness the application of plea 
bargaining eliminated from the cases, who are, to some 
degree, forced to accept the sentencing recommendation. 
This is one of the reasons why defendants disagree with it 
or appeal for a lesser sentence (Hu, 2018, 280).
3. IMPROVEMENT OF THE RIGHTS OF 
PROSECUTORIAL COUNTER-APPEAL IN 
THE CONTEXT OF PLEA BARGAINING 
3.1 Identify the Purposes of the Right of Appeal
3.1.1 Fully Understand and Respect the Right of 
Appeal of the Defendant
According to Paragraph 3 of Article 227 of the Criminal 
Procedure Law, a defendant shall not be deprived of the 
right to appeal under any pretext. In the context of plea 
bargaining, both the judicial and legislation authorities 
should come to a consensus about the protection of 
the legal rights of the defendant. Namely, the right of 
appeal of the defendant should not be restricted under 
any circumstances. Rather, the court should establish a 
mechanism to distinguish genuine and fraudulent grounds 
of appeal and step up efforts in the interpretation of laws 
for the defendant after the verdict in the first instance. 
Specifically, cases involving an appeal for a conducted 
sentence can be responded with questioning in court or a 
custodial interrogation to identify whether the accused is 
practicing a technical appeal. If so, further communication 
with the detention center should be conducted to dispel 
such notions. 
3.1.2 Establish a System of Appeal to Reason 
Cases applying expedited procedures at trials in the 
context of plea bargaining are normally minor criminal 
cases settled through the negotiation between the parties, 
where the accused have already enjoyed a sentence 
discount following his or her plea of guilt in the first 
instance. This requires the court to review and screen 
the grounds of appeal and respond accordingly. An 
appeal should be allowed when there are mistakes in 
substantive issues such as conviction and sentencing, 
serious violations in procedures, or involuntary confession 
of guilt and acceptance of punishment under duress. As 
for those who appeal without solid grounds and attempt 
to access sentence serving in detention centers, the court 
of the second instance should reject the appeal directly 
before any chance for the second instance proceedings is 
found (Han, 2020, pp.52-59).
3.2 Follow the Principle of Parsimony
Maintain the minimum use of the right of prosecutorial 
counter-appeal. In cases involving plea bargaining, 
prosecuting authorities can borrow the legal language 
pattern of “generally shall adopt” used by courts regarding 
sentencing recommendation, and are stipulated to adopt 
the principle of “generally shall not counter-appeal”. 
Thus, in plea bargaining, prosecuting authorities feature 
a complementing pair of the rigidity of “generally 
shall adopt” in sentencing recommendation and the 
flexibility of “generally shall not counter-appeal” after the 
defendant’s appeal. To be specific, if the defendant appeals 
without performing his or her obligations of apology, 
refund, compensation for losses, payment of fines etc. 
in the written statement of plea of guilt after the court 
adopts the sentencing recommendation from prosecuting 
authorities and gives a lenient sentence to the defendant 
in accordance with the law, prosecuting authorities can 
respond with a counter-appeal; If the defendant appeals 
against the accused criminal facts or sentencing or without 
solid grounds, the court of second instance shall try the 
case according to law.
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3.3 Reinforce Protection of the Legal Rights of 
the Accused
3.3.1 Protect the Free Will of the Defendant 
The free will of criminal suspects and defendants should 
be protected in the event of conviction of innocent people. 
That means, criminal suspects should be fully informed 
their rights and obligation in litigation and possible 
consequences brought by plea of guilt and acceptance of 
sentencing and be comprehensively heard by investigation 
and prosecuting authorities in different phases from 
investigation, arrest to prosecution. Among them, the most 
important information is that an appeal is only allowed 
when it is filed against problems in facts, evidence or 
procedures rather than the term of sentence after the courts 
apply plea bargaining in the case and adopt the sentence 
term recommended by prosecuting authorities. 
3.3.2 Engage Criminal Defense Lawyers in the 
Proceedings
As they are streamlined, expedite procedures at trials 
require a higher level of involvement of criminal defense 
lawyers to prevent the legal rights of defendants from 
infringing (Hao and Yao, 2018, pp. 49-59). A successful 
defense strategy is the premise for the reduction of the 
practice of appealing against involuntary guilty plea of 
the defendant. In response, the pilot program of criminal 
defense lawyers’ involvement has been developed to 
cover an expansive scope of applicable situations, which 
means legal aid will be provided in the trial proceedings in 
the first instance and, more importantly, defense services 
in the second instance and retrial procedures. Far less 
legally knowledgeable than investigators and prosecutors, 
criminal suspects and defendants are put at a disadvantage. 
This might explain the small proportion of defense 
lawyers’ involvement in criminal cases. To balance out 
the disadvantage, lawyers should play an active role in the 
cases involving plea bargaining, especially in the phase of 
prosecution, to ensure the legal rights of criminal suspects 
and defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
Plea bargaining per se is an explorative, inclusive 
system that combines substantive rules and procedural 
rules in criminal lawsuits. It can be further developed to 
regulate appeals, prosecutorial counter-appeals and trial 
proceedings in the second instance and thread justice 
and efficiency at the core of the system through criminal 
lawsuits. From a macro perspective, the implementation 
of plea bargaining represents a major advancement in the 
values of criminal litigation, which becomes more tolerant 
and grants the accused a higher level of autonomy. As a 
result, it adds diversity to the models of criminal litigation, 
with a new kind of cooperation and mutual benefits on 
top of the original confrontation between the government 
and the accused. Therefore, the legal interpretations of 
practice of appeals by the accused and counter-appeals 
by prosecuting authorities will give impetus to the 
development of the system of plea bargaining and play as 
the touchstone of relevant legal procedures. 
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